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Abstract 
 This article explores the effect of sub-national tax autonomy and sub-national 
control over shared taxes on primary deficits with panel data for 23 OECD 
countries over the 1975-2000 period. The results suggest that sub-national tax 
autonomy has a U-shaped effect on primary deficits. We find that the “average” 
country in the sample could increase the fiscal stability of its public sector by 
reducing sub-national tax autonomy. There is also some indication that 
subnational control over shared taxes increases fiscal stability, but we obtain this 
result only if Belgium and Spain are included in the sample. 
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Introduction 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that sub-national fiscal autonomy may cause budget imbalances and 
macroeconomic instability. In Brazil, for example, sub-national governments borrowed heavily from 
state-owned banks and then defaulted on repayment, thereby forcing the federal government to bail out 
the banks to forestall financial chaos (Samuels 2003). In 1992 the German constitutional court 
compelled the federal government to grant bailout transfers to two states after they had accumulated 
such high levels of public debt that they found it difficult to provide a basic level of public services to 
their citizens (Seitz 1999). In Argentina, the structure of the intergovernmental transfer scheme 
aggravated macroeconomic difficulties by providing sub-national governments with incentives to over-
spend and over-borrow (Tomassi et al. 2001).  
 
These developments have drawn scholarly attention to the relationship between fiscal decentralization 
(i.e. subnational tax and/or expenditure autonomy) and public finances. One strand of the literature, 
exemplified by contributions such as Wildasin (1997), Wibbels (2000), or Goodspeed (2002), suggests 
that sub-national fiscal autonomy may indeed cause fiscal policy distortions and inefficiently high 
levels of public debt because of soft budget constraints or coordination failures. However, there is a 
different and well established strand of the literature which claims that fiscal decentralization ensures 
allocative efficiency (Oates 1972) and prevents inefficient government intervention (Brennan and 
Buchanan 1980). Consequently, this strand of the literature indicates that fiscal decentralization will 
increase the fiscal stability of the public sector.  
 
Since the relationship between fiscal decentralization and fiscal outcomes is theoretically ambiguous, 
we examine in this article empirically whether fiscal decentralization improves or endangers public 
finances with data on twenty-three OECD countries over the 1975-2000 period. In doing so, we extend 
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the existing literature on this question in two ways.  
 
The first contribution of this article is that two new measures for the extent of tax decentralization are 
used to empirically operationalize the concept of fiscal decentralization. These new measures are 
provided by Stegarescu (2005) and are constructed according to a classification proposed by the OECD 
(OECD 1999). The Stegarescu (2005) measures constitute an improvement over the “revenue 
decentralization” measures that are traditionally used in the fiscal federalism literature because they 
attempt to capture the “true” fiscal autonomy of sub-national governments. That is, the traditional 
measures of tax decentralization, which are usually based on IMF GFS data, do not distinguish between 
revenues obtained by sub-national governments through taxes over which they may decide 
autonomously, and revenues obtained through taxes over which they have no control (Ebel and Yilmaz 
2002). The Stegarescu (2005) measures, on the other hand, take the autonomous taxing power of 
subnational governments into account. In particular, they capture over-time changes in the tax 
autonomy of subnational governments.
1
 
 
The second contribution of this article is that non- linearities in the relationship between subnational 
tax autonomy and public deficits are explicitly modeled. Most studies on the relationship between 
fiscal decentralization and public finances use a linear specification (De Mello 2000, Freitag and Vatter 
2008, Baskaran  2010).
2
 By doing so, they implicitly assume that the effect of an additional increase in 
fiscal decentralization on public deficits is the same irrespective of its currently prevailing level. This is 
a strong assumption. It is more likely that the effect of an increase in fiscal decentralization on public 
deficits depends on its currently prevailing level. For example, an additional increase in fiscal 
decentralization might improve the fiscal stability of the public sector if a country is highly centralized 
by allowing citizens to vote with their feet (Tiebout 1956). However, if a country is already heavily 
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decentralized, then an additional increase might exacerbate coordination problems and lead to worse 
fiscal outcomes. Yet, it is also possible that either a completely centralized or decentralized public 
sector is preferable to an intermediate system, as intermediate systems might suffer from a blurring of 
responsibilities and an inefficient overlap of government activities. Consequently, we estimate in this 
article empirical models that allow for the possibility of a non-linear relationship between our measures 
for tax decentralization and public deficits.  
 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The next section provides some theoretical 
considerations on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and public finances and a short 
literature review. The data used in the empirical analysis and the econometric model are described in 
the following section. We then present the results and end with some concluding remarks. 
 
The link between tax decentralization and public deficits 
There are a number of reasons why fiscal decentralization might endanger the fiscal stability of the 
public sector: First, if the fiscal constitution and/or the political reality in a country is such that the 
federal government is held responsible for the fiscal well-being of sub-national governments, then the 
latter might expect to receive a bailout in times of fiscal crisis. This expectation will render the budget 
of sub-national governments “soft” and induce them to increase expenditures and/or decrease taxes, 
which in turn will lead to higher public deficits (Wildasin 1997, Goodspeed 2002).  
 
A second argument is that fiscal decentralization might lead to larger deficits if it is used by the central 
government to impose new or additional spending responsibilities on subnational governments without 
giving them sufficient revenue raising capabilities. Decentralization processes might be characterized 
by this phenomenon when subnational governments have little political power or low legitimacy in the 
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eyes of the population (Rodirguez-Pose and Gill 2003). Consequently, a correlation between some 
measures of fiscal decentralization, in particular tax decentralization, and public deficits might emerge. 
Yet, it is also possible that fiscal decentralization increases deficits if subnational governments are too 
powerful. In this case, they can force the federal government to assume any debt that they have 
acquired in exchange for political support. Granting additional fiscal autonomy to subnational 
governments in such circumstances might then lead to more fiscal instability. Rodriguez-Pose and Gill 
(2004) illustrate this problem with the example of Brazil. Because Brazilian states have traditionally 
been politically powerful, they over-borrowed assuming that they could eventually force the federal 
government to take over their debt. 
 
Third, if the fiscal constitution is characterized by extensive tax sharing arrangements and horizontal 
equalization, incentives for efficient and growth-enhancing activities are likely to be diminished since 
these institutional features are in effect a tax on sound fiscal policies. Even though these inefficiencies 
must not necessarily lead to higher deficits, a positive correlation between the receipts from tax sharing 
arrangements or horizontal transfer schemes and the accumulation of debt is often observed 
empirically. Rodden (2005), for example, finds that the speed of fiscal consolidation of German States 
after negative fiscal shocks is inversely related to the amount of transfers received during horizontal 
equalization.  
 
Furthermore, decentralization and the related concept of federalism increases the number of veto-
players by providing additional institutional channels, such as a second chamber of parliament, through 
which opponents of reforms can voice their opposition (Tsebelis 1995). Since a larger number of 
political actors have to agree to fiscal decisions in decentralized systems, budget consolidations by 
large spending cuts or tax increases will be more difficult. In addition to such institutionalized channels 
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of obstruction, the cohesion of national fiscal policies becomes more difficult to maintain when every 
individual jurisdiction may act independently of the federal and other sub-national governments 
(Wibbels 2000).
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However, there are also a number of theoretical arguments why fiscal decentralization should decrease 
public deficits. Decentralization of fiscal authority will in all likelihood induce competition for mobile 
tax payers by sub-national governments (Tiebout 1956, Brennan and Buchanan 1980). By analogy to 
private markets, competition might force local governments to implement optimal policies both in 
terms of technical and allocative efficiency. Increases in the efficiency of the public sector might then 
lead to lower deficits if they imply, for example, that a given amount of public goods can be provided 
with fewer resources. Furthermore, under fiscal competition, jurisdictions which maximize the inter-
temporal revenue flow should choose low levels of debt in order to motivate citizens to move into their 
jurisdictions, as low levels of indebtedness signal, ceteris paribus, low future taxes. 
 
Fiscal decentralization may also be interpreted as a means to use dispersed information efficiently 
(Hayek 1945). Lower-level governments are likely to be better informed about local circumstances, and 
are capable to take these into account when implementing policies. For example, the better knowledge 
of local geographical conditions that sub-national officials possess might be helpful in avoiding 
situations where ex-post costs of infrastructure projects turn out to be higher than initially projected.  
 
Under a decentralized public sector, jurisdictions can also experiment with new policies as suggested 
by the literature on laboratory federalism (Oates 1999). Institutional arrangements which ensure sound 
fiscal policies can be developed gradually in individual jurisdictions and, if they turn out to be 
successful, passed on to other jurisdictions. This has been, for example, the case in Switzerland where 
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mechanisms which were intended to arrest the growth of public debt, in particular the so called “debt 
brake”, have been initially introduced in a small number of sub-national jurisdictions, but gradually 
extended to a larger number of cantons and eventually even adopted at the federal level (Feld and 
Kirchgaessner 2007).  
 
Overall, the theoretical literature on whether decentralization improves or endangers the fiscal stability 
of the public sector is somewhat ambiguous. Therefore, this question is essentially an empirical one. 
The empirical literature on this topic uses different approaches. First, case studies have been conducted 
that focus on the systems of fiscal federalism prevailing in individual countries. For example, Rodden 
et al. (2003) discuss the presence of soft budget constraints in various countries, and find that if 
intergovernmental transfer schemes are ill-designed, fiscal decentralization might endanger public 
finances.  Von Hagen et al. (2000) discuss bailout episodes in four OECD countries: Australia, 
Germany, Italy, and Sweden. They show that the likelihood of fiscal profligacy is related to both 
idiosyncratic characteristics of sub-national jurisdictions and the political goals of the federal 
government. They argue furthermore that unsustainable policies by sub-national jurisdictions must not 
necessarily lead to a worsening of sub-national finances if the federal government, in anticipation of the 
fiscal woes of lower-level jurisdictions, quietly increases vertical transfers.  Finally, Kirchgaessner 
(2005) argues, on the basis of the Swiss experience, that federal countries are more capable to limit 
fiscal profligacy than unitary states. 
 
Compared to the extensive number of case studies, empirical contributions that explicitly address the 
relationship between fiscal decentralization and public deficits with econometric methods are relatively 
rare. They have been conducted at the sub-national level within individual countries and at the 
international level with cross-country data.  
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There are several notable examples for single country studies. Freitag and Vatter (2008) find that in 
Switzerland, decentralized cantons are more likely to run balanced budgets in times of economic crisis. 
Schaltegger and Feld (2008) discuss the propensity of Swiss cantons toward budget consolidations and 
reach the conclusion that decentralization improves a canton’s ability to consolidate its budget. Rattso 
(2004) finds for Norway that the specific system of decentralization in this country leads to a 
smoothing of local budgets by the central government.  
 
Even though studies based on data at the sub-national level within a country have important advantages 
such as dealing with a relatively stable and comparable cultural and historical environment – a fact 
which makes ceteris paribus conclusions more convincing– they also have some disadvantages. In 
particular, the fiscal policies of the central government are usually neglected. This, however, is 
problematic because the central government is, in many countries, responsible for the social security 
system and provides large amounts of intergovernmental grants. 
 
Despite the ability of cross-country studies to paint a more comprehensive picture, their number is 
relatively small. De Mello (2000) explores the impact of decentralization on the deficit of both the 
federal and sub-national governments separately with a sample consisting of thirty countries. He uses 
sub-national tax autonomy as measured by the IMF’s GFS data as a proxy for decentralization and 
concludes that it generally leads to an increase of sub-national deficits, suggesting that fiscal 
decentralization might aggravate soft budget constraints and coordination failures.  Fornsari et al. 
(2000) find in a study with thirty-two developing and industrial countries that expenditure 
decentralization contributes to a larger government sector, but that sub-national deficits have no impact 
on the fiscal balance of the central government. However, once a measure based on sub-national 
9 
 
revenues is used, decentralization seems to decrease central government deficits.  Thornton and Mati 
(2008) examine whether fiscal decentralization impedes a coordinated national fiscal policy in OECD 
countries. They find that changes in the fiscal balances of federal and sub-national governments tend to 
be strongly correlated, and conclude on the basis of this evidence that decentralization does not 
complicate fiscal stabilization policies. Baskaran (2010) finds that expenditure decentralization is 
negatively related to public debt for a panel of seventeen OECD countries. Tax decentralization and 
vertical fiscal imbalances, on the other hand, seem to have no (linear) effect on public debt. Finally, 
Neyapti (2010) finds that both expenditure and revenue decentralization reduce, in general, budget 
deficits, but that that the strength of this effect varies according to a number of country-specific factors 
such as the size of the population or whether local elections are held. 
 
Furthermore, some studies on public deficits which are not primarily concerned with fiscal 
decentralization nonetheless include a variable in order to control for its degree. Singh and Plekhanov 
(2005), for example, include a measure of expenditure decentralization in their regressions, even 
though they are actually interested in the impact of borrowing restrictions on sub-national deficits. 
They find that decentralization increases deficits once they control for the presence of country fixed 
effects. Rodden (2002) studies the effect of intergovernmental transfer schemes, and in particular the 
effect of vertical grants, on the fiscal stance of sub-national and central governments. The implicit 
assumption is that grants reduce sub-national revenue autonomy and thereby increase the vertical fiscal 
imbalance. He finds that vertical fiscal imbalances do not generally increase deficits, thereby indirectly 
suggesting that revenue and/or expenditure autonomy have no significant effect on fiscal outcomes. 
Data and empirical model 
We use panel data on twenty-three high-income OECD countries
4
 for the 1975-2000 period to estimate 
the following empirical model:  
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Yit = ai+ct+ β1 DECit+ β2 DECit × DECit+δXit+εit.       (1) 
 
The dependent variable, Yit is the general government primary deficit to GDP ratio. On the right hand 
side, we include country fixed effects, ai, year fixed effects, ct, measures for the extent of fiscal 
decentralization, DECit, their quadratic transformations, DECit ×DECit , and a vector of additional 
control variables, Xit. All variables used in the analysis are explained and their sources are listed in 
Table 1. Summary statistics can be found in Table 1 in the Data Appendix (Supplementary Data).  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
We use as dependent variable the general government primary deficit to GDP ratio because fiscal 
profligacy at the sub-national level must not necessarily lead to increases in sub-national deficits. For if 
the federal government borrows in place of sub-national governments and passes these additional 
revenues quietly to the latter by means of intergovernmental transfers, the federal budget might display 
a deficit while sub-national budgets remain balanced (Rodriguez-Pose and Gill 2003). Thus, it is 
necessary to consider the fiscal stance of all tiers of government simultaneously when discussing the 
effects of fiscal decentralization on public deficits.  
 
The choice of the right-hand side variables is derived from theoretical reasoning and econometric tests. 
Country fixed effects are included to control for both unobserved heterogeneity and for rarely time-
varying institutional features such as the political (presidential vs. parliamentary) or electoral 
(proportional vs. majoritarian) system
5
; year fixed effects are included to control for common shocks. 
Because tests indicate the presence of both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, we use robust 
standard errors and cluster at the country-level.  
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All regressions control for the population size, GDP growth, the unemployment rate, the inflation rate, 
an urbanity index, the share of the working population, a measure of openness, and the interest rate on 
government bonds.  These measures are likely to be important economic or socio-demographic 
determinants of public deficits. They are mostly obtained from OECD databases. The only exception is 
the urbanity index, which is obtained from the UN’s World Urbanization Prospects database.  
 
Since there might be ideological differences in the attitude towards fiscal stability, we also control for 
the ideology of the federal government by using an index provided by Armingeon et al. (2008). In 
addition, we control in all regressions for the political authority of subnational governments by 
including the regional authority index by Hooghe et al. (2010) because politically powerful subnational 
governments may have a better resource base than powerless ones and therefore may be able to run 
sounder fiscal policies. On the other hand, central governments might find it difficult to impose hard 
budget constraints if subnational governments are too powerful.  
 
Finally, we also include in some regressions the total government revenue to GDP ratio and the 
subnational tax revenue to GDP ratio to control for the expenditure capacity of subnational 
governments. We desist from including these variables in all models because they might suffer from 
endogeneity problems when central or subnational governments deliberately raise revenues because 
they plan to spend more or expect higher deficits.
6
 These variables are obtained from OECD databases. 
(See Table 1 for the specific sources). 
 
We apply two different measures of fiscal decentralization, one pertaining to the ability of sub-national 
governments to autonomously determine tax rates and/or bases for “own” taxes (taxes for which the 
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revenues accrue exclusively to sub-national governments, OTD), and one pertaining to sub-national 
control over the revenue split for taxes that are shared with the federal government (STD).   
 
The OTD and STD measures are obtained from Stegarescu (2005). He constructs these measures 
according to a classification proposed by OECD (1999). OECD (1999) classifies individual taxes 
within a country into three main categories: i) Taxes whose revenue accrue to subnational governments 
and for which subnational government can either determine rates and/or bases independently, ii) taxes 
that are shared between the central and subnational governments and for which, at the very least, the 
revenue split cannot be changed without the consent of subnational governments, and iii) all other 
taxes. The OTD measure is defined as the sum of the revenues from the taxes belonging to the first 
category divided by total general government tax revenues. The STD
7
 measure is defined as the sum of 
the revenues from taxes belonging to the second category divided by total general government tax 
revenues.
8
  
 
Many countries have experienced significant variability with respect to the level of tax decentralization. 
See Figure 1 in the Data Appendix (Supplementary Data) for plots of the evolution of the OTD 
measure in all countries included in the sample. Countries such as Belgium, Portugal, and Spain have 
considerably expanded the extent of subnational tax autonomy. On the other hand, the United Kingdom 
has become more centralized during the sample period. Other countries, e.g. Sweden and Norway, 
exhibit both phases of distinct centralization and decentralization, but no overall trend. Finally, there 
are also some countries that have exhibited relatively constant levels of fiscal decentralization, in 
particular such archetypical federations as Canada, Switzerland, and the United States.  
 
Figure 2 in the Data Appendix (Supplementary Data) shows the evolution of the shared taxes 
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decentralization measure (STD) during the sample period. Only five countries - Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Spain, and Switzerland – exhibit positive values for this variable, and therefore only these 
five countries are included in the figure. The other countries in the sample consistently exhibit a value 
of 0. In fact, only Belgium and Spain display significant over-time variation in this variable.   
 
Except perhaps for the inclusion of the quadratic transformation, the specification in Equation (1) 
follows most of the existing literature. The quadratic transformations, i.e. OTD × OTX and STD × 
STD, respectively, are included to take possible non-linearities in the relationship between tax 
decentralization and public deficits into account. In other words, by including these transformations, we 
allow for the possibility that the effect of an increase in fiscal decentralization depends on its currently 
prevailing level. If the estimated coefficients for these quadratic transformations are significant, we can 
conclude that the OTD and STD variables have a non-linear (or more precisely a quadratic) effect on 
public deficits.  
 
Baseline results 
We first estimate five models without the quadratic terms in order to “replicate” the studies that assume 
a linear relationship between fiscal decentralization and fiscal outcomes; thereafter, we re-estimate the 
same models with the quadratic terms included in order to explore non-linear effects. 
  
[Table 2 about here] 
 
The results are collected in Table 2. The first two models in both sets of regressions include each of the 
decentralization measures separately; in the third model, we include both decentralization measures 
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jointly; in the fourth model, we additionally include the government revenue to GDP variable. In the 
fifth model, we expand the fourth model by including the subnational tax revenue to GDP ratio.  
 
In the linear models, the estimated coefficient for the OTD variable is insignificant, whereas that for the 
STD variable is significantly negative. These results suggest that sub-national control over the revenue 
split for shared taxes leads to lower primary deficits. Prima facie, they also indicate that sub-national 
tax autonomy is irrelevant for fiscal outcomes.  
 
The non-linear models, however, compel us to re-evaluate this particular conclusion. The highly 
significant coefficient for the quadratic transformation of the OTD variable indicates that sub-national 
tax autonomy has a non-linear effect on primary deficits. Since the “base” effect is negative and the 
quadratic transformation is positive, we conclude that the aggregate marginal effect of sub-national tax 
autonomy on primary deficits is U-shaped: A marginal increase leads to smaller primary deficits at low 
levels of sub-national tax autonomy, and to larger primary deficits at higher levels. Depending on the 
particular model, the optimal (i. e., “deficit-minimizing”) level for our measure for sub-national tax 
autonomy is between 5.3 percent and 16.7 percent. We plot the marginal effect of this variable at 
different values of OTD in Figure 1. The plot is based on the estimates in model Q 5 which we consider 
as our preferred model because it has the most complete specification. This plot illustrates once more 
that at low levels of OTD, a further increase leads to lower deficits. However, the effect turns positive 
from some point onwards. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
The STD variable, on the other hand, does not display a non-linear effect; instead, the estimates 
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confirm the findings from the linear models and suggest that sub-national control over shared taxes 
leads “linearly” to lower primary deficits. Yet, this conclusion should be viewed with caution given 
that it is based on variation in at most only five countries. 
 
Finally, we also calculate the marginal effect of the decentralization variables at the sample averages. 
These marginal effects are collected in the lower part of Table 2. They suggest that the “average” 
OECD country in our sample could reduce primary deficits by lowering sub-national tax autonomy and 
increasing sub-national control of shared taxes.  
 
The remaining control variables perform reasonably. The unemployment rate, for example, has a 
consistently significant and positive effect on deficits, which suggests that high unemployment rates 
tend to destabilize public budgets by requiring the government to increase spending. Openness, on the 
other hand, displays negative coefficient estimates. This suggests that increasing openness leads to 
more balanced budgets. Finally, both subnational tax revenues and total government revenues tend to 
reduce public deficits.  
Robustness checks 
In this section, we investigate the robustness of the baseline results. We conduct four robustness checks 
on the basis of Model Q 5 in Table 2 (our preferred model). The results are collected in Table 3. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
We study first whether our results from the previous section are sensitive to outliers by means of two 
different tests. In the column entitled Outlier, we drop all observations for which the absolute value of 
the standardized residual in our preferred model is larger than 2 and re-estimate the preferred model. 
16 
 
Dropping these outliers, however, does not change the main conclusions from the baseline models. The 
OTD variable continues to display a U-shaped relationship with primary deficits; and the marginal 
effect at the sample average remains positive. At the same time, the STD variable turns insignificant, 
but continues to display a negative (albeit insignificant) coefficient at the sample average. 
 
In the column entitled Without BEL & ESP, we drop Belgium and Spain from the sample. These two 
countries might influence the estimates for the decentralization variables disproportionately because 
they have experienced in the last two decades a rapid move toward decentralization. Since the relevant 
reforms were deliberately implemented for political reasons, it is conceivable that the decision makers 
have taken special care to ensure the fiscal stability of sub-national governments.  
 
Dropping Belgium and Spain indeed suggests different conclusions– but only with respect to the STD 
variable. When these two countries are not included, the STD variable displays an inversely U-shaped 
relationship, and its marginal effect at the sample average is positive. This indicates that sub-national 
control over shared taxes leads in general to higher fiscal imbalances; only in Belgium and Spain, it 
seems to have had a positive effect on the fiscal stability of the public sector. That is, once only 
countries with a long tradition of shared taxes are included, in particular Austria and Germany, tax 
sharing appears to increase deficits. 
 
 
The conclusions with respect to the OTD variable, however, are not affected by the exclusion of 
Belgium and Spain. This decentralization variable displays a U-shaped relationship; and its effect at the 
sample average is positive. 
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In the column entitled PCSE, we collect the results from a model where hypothesis tests are conducted 
on the basis of Panel Corrected Standard Errors. The standard errors are also robust to AR 1 
autocorrelation. The results with respect to the decentralization variables, however, are essentially the 
same as in the baseline models. 
 
In the column entitled Five Years, we collect the results from estimating our preferred model in five 
year averages in order to control for short-term variability in the dependent and control variables. This 
model includes five-year period instead of year fixed effects; standard errors continue to be clustered at 
the country level. The results are once again in line with the baseline results. 
 
Overall, these robustness checks confirm the baseline results for the OTD variable. With regard to the 
STD variable, however, they indicate that the results are sensitive to the in- or exclusion of Belgium 
and Spain. 
 
Conclusion 
In this article, we have explored whether fiscal decentralization, when measured by the extent of sub-
national control over tax revenues, has an effect on primary deficits. Our results indicate that sub-
national control over shared taxes is negatively and linearly related to primary deficits. This conclusion, 
however, is mainly driven by developments in Belgium and Spain. While suggestive, this particular 
finding should therefore be viewed with caution. Sub-national tax autonomy (i.e., control over own 
taxes), on the other hand, has a non-linear effect. The estimates indicate that an increase in subnational 
tax autonomy results in more fiscal stability in countries where the prevailing level of tax autonomy is 
low. Yet, they also suggest that tax autonomy has a detrimental effect for fiscal stability from some 
point onwards.  
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Given the widespread trend towards more decentralized government, the question of how to organize 
and manage decentralization processes has acquired added importance (Rodden 2006). The findings in 
this study should therefore be of interest to policy makers in both developed and developing nations as 
they provide answers to one important challenge for fiscal decentralization initiatives: how to ensure 
the stability of the fiscal sector when responsibility for fiscal policy is shared among various units of 
government.  
 
In summary, these regressions appear to indicate that granting too much tax autonomy to subnational 
jurisdictions can be problematic. That fiscal decentralization can begin to be detrimental at relatively 
low levels is an unexpected finding, especially because the theoretical literature reviewed in Section 2 
points to a number of reasons why decentralization should lead to more sustainable fiscal policies.  
 
One explanation for this unexpected finding might lie in how the countries that were studied in this 
article have managed their decentralization processes. Bahl (1999) lists a set of criteria, or 
implementation rules, which should be fulfilled for decentralization to unfold its beneficial 
implications. Most notably, he argues that the political authority of subnational governments should 
match their fiscal authority and that they should have sufficient revenue sources. It is possible that at 
least some of the countries in our sample have breached these rules. In particular, decentralization 
could have been initiated by the central government as a stratagem to divest itself from its 
responsibilities. Central governments may have imposed new tasks on subnational governments while 
not increasing their funding sources sufficiently. In other words, subnational governments may have 
had too little political power to effectively defend themselves against unfunded mandates. While such 
insufficiently funded mandates would result in a correlation between subnational tax autonomy and 
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public deficits, tax autonomy as such would not be the cause for the increases in public deficits, but 
rather insufficient tax autonomy and too little political power.
9 
 
One possible implication of the results in this article, therefore, is that subnational fiscal autonomy can 
unfold its beneficial consequences only if central governments are truly committed to decentralization. 
If, on the other hand, fiscal decentralization is only a convenient means for central governments do deal 
with their own fiscal problems, it might have undesirable consequences. 
 
A second explanation for the unfavorable findings regarding subnational tax autonomy is that our 
regressions rely on the within-variation only, and such highly decentralized countries as Switzerland 
and the United States exhibit only little over-time variation in the tax decentralization variable. That is, 
little information on the effects of decentralization on public deficits is used from countries that are 
widely considered to be successful federations. This means in turn that the estimates rely to a large 
extent on information from countries that have little experience with decentralization. It is therefore 
likely that the results are overly pessimistic. In fact, we cannot dismiss the possibility that (even more) 
tax autonomy will improve fiscal stability in countries that have sufficient experience with 
decentralized policy making, i.e. in countries such as Switzerland and the United States. On the other 
hand, subnational tax autonomy seems to be problematic for fiscal stability in countries that have little 
experience with decentralization, at least in the short run.  
 
It follows from our results that one challenge for future research on the implications of fiscal 
decentralization for fiscal stability is to pay more attention to the details of why processes of 
decentralization are initialized and how they are managed. In particular, detailed studies on the 
interactions of the political and fiscal dimensions of decentralization are necessary to gain further 
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insights on how to successfully manage decentralization processes, and to understand what conditions 
have to prevail for decentralization to lead to favorable outcomes. Insights gained from such studies 
will ensure that countries which decide to increase the extent of subnational autonomy will fully reap 
the benefits of decentralization. 
Notes 
Supplementary data can be found at wwww.publius.oxfordjouranls.org. The author thanks three 
anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions.   
 
  1. Sorens (2011) notes in a recent contribution that the Stegarescu measures, too, have some 
shortcomings. He argues that they do not control for unfunded mandates and may consequently give a 
misleading picture of the true level of fiscal decentralization within a country. 
 
  2. However, sometimes interaction effects are included to condition the effect of fiscal 
decentralization on other variables. 
 
  3. As pointed out by Freitag and Vatter (2008), the veto-player argument can also be used in an 
opposite fashion. That is, it is possible to argue that fiscal decentralization will lead to lower deficits 
because agreement on additional expenditures funded through debt becomes harder. 
 
  4. Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. 
 
  5. Hausman-test and F-tests on the significance of the country dummies also suggest that the fixed 
effects model is appropriate. 
 
  6.  Note, however, that our results change neither qualitatively nor quantitatively between the models 
that include and those that omit these variables, thereby suggesting that such problems are not affecting 
our results. 
 
  7. Note that the original variable in Stegarescu’s dataset is constructed as the sum of own and shared 
taxes. In this article, we redefine this variable (by appropriate subtraction) such that it only covers 
shared taxes.  
 
  8. While the Stegarescu (2005) dataset covers the period 1975-2001, observations in 2001 are missing 
for several countries. Therefore, we restrict the sample in the regressions to the 1975-2000 period. 
Because of a suggestion by a referee, we attempted to update the database such that it additionally 
covers the period 2001-2006 by following the methodology in Stegarescu (2005) and OECD (1999) 
and using the OECD’s Revenue Statistics database. However, a number of decisions have to be made 
with regard to the classification of the individual taxes included in the OECD Revenue Statistics 
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database when the OTD and STD variables are constructed. Since we lacked detailed information on 
the decisions made in Stegarescu (2005) regarding the classification of the taxes, it was difficult to 
ensure complete consistency with Stegarescu’s data. For the time-frame where both our and 
Stegarescu’s data were available, the correlation was around 0.9 for the respective OTD and STD 
measures. (In order to conduct this comparison, we calculated our data from 1995 onwards.) This 
indicates that both datasets are roughly similar, but it also shows that they are not fully consistent. In 
addition, there were some notable differences in the levels of the OTD and STD measures for some 
countries. Nevertheless, the results (available upon request) when using the updated database are in line 
with those reported in the article.  
 
 9. For example, Vinueala (2000, p. 23) notes that unfunded mandates to subnational governments were 
partly to blame for borrowing in some Spanish Regions. 
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Table 1: Definition and source of variables 
 
Label Description Source 
 Dependent variable  
Primary deficit Primary deficit of general government in percent 
of GDP 
OECD Economic Outlook No. 83 
 Decentralization measures  
OTD Sub-national revenue from taxes for which sub-
national governments determine rates and/or 
define bases as share of general government tax 
revenue (own taxes decentralization) 
Stegarescu (2005) 
STD Sub-national revenue from taxes for which sub-
national governments determine the revenue 
split as share of general government revenue 
(shared taxes decentralization) 
Stegarescu (2005) 
 Control variables  
Population Population OECD Population and Labor Force Dataset 
GDP growth GDP per capita growth OECD Economic Outlook No. 83 
Unemployment Unemployment rate OECD Economic Outlook No. 83 
Inflation Growth of CPI Index OECD Key Economic Indicators 
Urbanity Share of population living in urban areas World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 
Revision (UN) 
Working age Share of population between 15 and 65 years OECD Population and Labor Force Dataset 
Ideology Index of the ideology of government, higher 
values indicate more leftist ideology 
CPDS I Dataset 1960-2006 (Armingeon et al. 
2008) 
Openness Trade-to-GDP ratio OECD Macro Trade Indicators 
Interest rate Long-term interest rate on government bonds OECD Economic Outlook No. 83 
Regional Authority Index Index measuring the political authority of 
regional governments 
Hooghe et al. (2010) 
Government revenue Government revenue in percent of GDP OECD Economic Outlook No. 83 
Subnational tax revenue Subnational tax revenue in percent of GDP OECD Revenue Statistics 
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Table 2: Regressions of primary deficit to GDP ratio on decentralization measures; 1975-2000; Fixed effects 
 
 Linear Models Quadratic Models 
 LI 1 LI 2 LI 3 LI 3 LI 4 LI 5 Q 1 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Q 5 
 b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t 
Population 0.009 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.013 0.015 -0.007 0.001 0.001 -0.008 
 (0.290) (-0.225) (-0.220) (-0.220) (-0.165) (-0.419) (0.522) (-0.252) (0.029) (0.039) (-0.276) 
GDP growth -0.079 -0.100 -0.079 -0.079 -0.141* -0.125* -0.092 -0.093 -0.084 -0.123* -0.100* 
 (-0.862) (-1.027) (-0.823) (-0.823) (-1.912) (-1.899) (-1.154) (-0.928) (-0.974) (-1.856) (-1.800) 
Unemployment 0.531** 0.469** 0.451** 0.451** 0.497** 0.459** 0.463** 0.469** 0.401** 0.432** 0.377** 
 (2.630) (2.515) (2.365) (2.365) (2.570) (2.372) (2.642) (2.538) (2.399) (2.406) (2.121) 
Inflation -0.032 -0.010 -0.028 -0.028 -0.034 -0.005 -0.048 -0.017 -0.050 -0.050 -0.014 
 (-0.410) (-0.129) (-0.344) (-0.344) (-0.408) (-0.064) (-0.629) (-0.215) (-0.650) (-0.632) (-0.202) 
Urbanity 0.227 0.211 0.250 0.250 0.225 0.200 0.195 0.222 0.227 0.211 0.178 
 (1.113) (1.024) (1.135) (1.135) (0.872) (0.895) (1.095) (1.070) (1.182) (0.961) (1.064) 
Working age -0.102 -0.240 -0.225 -0.225 -0.236 -0.350 0.033 -0.233 -0.072 -0.094 -0.228 
 (-0.312) (-0.864) (-0.756) (-0.756) (-0.793) (-1.179) (0.117) (-0.846) (-0.270) (-0.350) (-0.877) 
Ideology 0.064 0.104 0.106 0.106 0.163 0.137 0.103 0.110 0.143 0.172 0.140 
 (0.344) (0.553) (0.604) (0.604) (0.858) (0.702) (0.728) (0.583) (1.054) (1.148) (0.914) 
Openness -0.056* -0.052 -0.051 -0.051 -0.060* -0.052* -0.084** -0.053 -0.079** -0.082** -0.074** 
 (-1.749) (-1.656) (-1.585) (-1.585) (-1.850) (-1.857) (-2.428) (-1.671) (-2.264) (-2.267) (-2.413) 
Interest rate 0.224 0.198 0.245 0.245 0.211 0.144 0.246 0.210 0.272 0.246 0.163 
 (1.292) (1.224) (1.341) (1.341) (1.203) (0.860) (1.368) (1.292) (1.468) (1.370) (1.016) 
Regional 
authority index 
-0.228 -0.021 -0.102 -0.102 -0.072 -0.067 0.020 -0.016 0.119 0.115 0.141 
 (-1.003) (-0.091) (-0.440) (-0.440) (-0.351) (-0.329) (0.116) (-0.073) (0.678) (0.658) (0.854) 
Total 
government rev. 
    -0.219* -0.101    -0.132 0.029 
     (-1.882) (-0.737)    (-1.215) (0.242) 
Subnational tax 
rev. 
     -0.873     -1.132** 
      (-1.696)     (-2.759) 
OTD 0.042  0.118 0.118 0.138 0.289** -0.435**  -0.345** -0.292** -0.137 
 (0.330)  (1.104) (1.104) (1.439) (2.500) (-2.716)  (-2.621) (-2.327) (-1.046) 
OTD × OTD       0.013***  0.013*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 
       (3.683)  (3.518) (3.179) (3.844) 
STD  -0.228*** -0.277*** -0.277*** -0.302*** -0.194*  -0.369*** -0.378*** -0.341** -0.211 
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  (-3.431) (-3.244) (-3.244) (-3.495) (-1.781)  (-2.820) (-3.201) (-2.386) (-1.213) 
STD × STD        0.007 0.007 0.004 0.005 
        (1.170) (1.377) (0.700) (0.621) 
Mean OTD       0.089  0.148** 0.158** 0.356*** 
Mean STD        -0.310*** -0.317*** -0.304*** -0.168 
N 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 
Countries 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
R2 0.421 0.447 0.456 0.456 0.480 0.494 0.501 0.448 0.527 0.534 0.558 
RMS error 2.268 2.216 2.198 2.198 2.149 2.119 2.105 2.215 2.051 2.035 1.981 
 
Notes: 1. Mean OTD denotes the marginal effect of own taxes decentralization and STD the marginal effect of shared taxes 
decentralization at the sample average, 2. Country and time fixed effects are included in all models, estimated coefficients are not 
reported, 3. Stars indicate significance levels at 10 percent (*), 5 percent (**) and 1 percent (***), 4. Significance tests are conducted 
with standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (clustered at the country-level), 5. Model significance tests 
(F-tests) are omitted because of the use of clustered standard errors, 6. t-statistics in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Regressions of Primary Deficit to GDP ratio on decentralization measures; 1975 to 2000, 
Robustness checks 
 Outlier Without BEL & ESP PCSE Five Years 
 b/t b/t b/t b/t 
Population 0.002 -0.035 0.013 -0.040 
 (0.097) (-1.225) (1.283) (-1.198) 
GDP growth -0.139** -0.173*** -0.115*** -0.186 
 (-2.627) (-3.274) (-4.026) (-0.909) 
Unemployment 0.343*** 0.362 0.433*** 0.239 
 (3.576) (1.721) (8.723) (1.010) 
Inflation 0.032 0.059 -0.096** 0.227* 
 (0.499) (0.895) (-2.388) (1.839) 
Urbanity 0.103 0.091 0.112 0.209 
 (0.754) (0.552) (1.452) (0.997) 
Working age -0.164 -0.493** -0.302 -0.358 
 (-0.826) (-2.241) (-1.622) (-1.464) 
Ideology 0.134 0.058 0.051 0.177 
 (1.124) (0.310) (0.702) (0.741) 
Openness -0.078** -0.058* -0.044*** -0.101*** 
 (-2.750) (-2.070) (-4.094) (-3.544) 
Interest rate 0.023 0.089 0.134* 0.058 
 (0.179) (0.697) (1.921) (0.519) 
Regional authority 
index 
0.236** 0.025 0.008 0.410* 
 (2.148) (0.114) (0.132) (1.790) 
Total government 
rev. 
0.049 -0.024 -0.305*** 0.137 
 (0.569) (-0.186) (-6.709) (0.835) 
Subnational tax 
rev. 
-1.311*** -1.405*** -0.273* -1.564** 
 (-4.160) (-2.992) (-1.695) (-2.302) 
OTD -0.218** 0.024 -0.065 -0.200 
 (-2.308) (0.154) (-1.154) (-1.496) 
OTD ×OTD 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.007*** 0.016*** 
 (8.063) (3.592) (4.822) (4.671) 
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STD -0.137 3.864*** -0.154** -0.228 
 (-1.070) (4.301) (-2.176) (-0.872) 
STD × STD 0.004 -0.058*** 0.001 0.005 
 (0.602) (-3.898) (0.546) (0.471) 
Mean OTD 0.358*** 0.495*** 0.200*** 0.416*** 
Mean STD -0.102 3.393*** -0.142** -0.189 
N 463 446 494 98 
Countries 23 21 23 23 
R2 0.651 0.523  0.587 
RMS error 1.598 2.031 1.343 1.581 
Notes: 1. Mean OTD denotes the marginal effect of own taxes decentralization and Mean STD the marginal effect of shared 
taxes decentralization at the sample average, 2.  Country and time fixed effects are included in all models, estimated coefficients 
are not reported 3.  Stars indicate significance levels at 10 percent (*), 5 percent (**) and 1 percent (***), 4.  t-statistics in 
parentheses in models entitled Outlier, Without BEl & ESP , and Five year; z-statistic in parentheses in model entitled PCSE, 5. 
All models are replications of model Q5 in Table 2. 
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Figure 1: Marginal effect of own taxes decentralization on primary deficits 
 
